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JURISDICTION
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

has

jurisdiction

over

this

appeal pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1988), * 78-2-2 (1989), and
Rule 14(a), Rules of Utah Supreme Court.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This petition for review is from a Final Decision of
the Utah State Tax Commission on March 22, 1989, in favor of the
Audit

Division

of

the

"Commission") sustaining

Tax

Commission

the proposed

("Tax

Commission"

assessment

of

or

a fraud

penalty against Dennis Silver ("Petitioner" or "Silver").
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review in this
case:
1.

Whether

the Tax Commission has properly

inter-

preted and applied the fraudulent intent to evade tax provisions
of Utah Code Ann. § 59-14A-92 (1986 supplement), since:
(a) No tax was due from Silver and he was entitled to refunds for over collected tax in each year.
(b) The elements of fraudulent intent to evade
tax or other legal duty were not established by the evidence or
found by the Tax Commission hearing officer.
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(c)

The

facts found and evidence presented

are

inconsistent with the conclusions reached.
2.
burden

Whether

of proof

the Tax Commission met

pursuant

and

carried

to Utah Code Ann. S 59-14A-94

its

(1986

Supplement) (Addendum II), to establish that Mr. Silver has been
guilty of fraud with intent to evade tax since:
(a)

There were no factual findings of fraudulent

acts or evidence in the record to support a charge of fraud.
(b)

The conclusions reached are inconsistent with

the evidence presented and the factual findings.
3.

Whether

the

Commission

properly

assessed

the

proposed penalty and filed tax warrants under the provisions of
Utah

Code

Ann.

S

59-14A-79

(1986

Supplement),

renumbered

59-10-528 (1987), which have become a lien on Silver's property
prior

to the final determination

of petlitioner' s

liability

in

these proceedings.
STATEMENT OF CASE
1.

Nature of Case.

Mr. Silver did not file Federal or State

income tax

returns for the years 1977 through 1983 in the belief that he was
not required to file due to his low incomq and there being no tax
due.

(R55, 57, 218)
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The Utah State Tax Commission contacted
required him to file tax returns for these years.
Mr. Silver filed the tax returns.
refunds due Silver.

Silver and
(R148, 218)

All returns filed reflected

(R64)

The Commission subsequently proposed penalties of $50
per

return

for

failure

to

file pursuant

to Utah Code Ann.

S 59-14A-92Q) (1986 Supplement) (negligence penalties) and $1000
per return for fraudulent "intent to evade tax" pursuant to Utah
Code Section 59-14A-92(5) (1986 Supplement) (fraud penalties).
(R41, 146)
Mr.

Silver

contested

the

proposed

assessments

at

informal and formal hearings before the Tax Commission.
2.

Course of Proceedings.

On or around November 1, 1986 Mr. Silver received a
notice that the Tax Commission was proposing penalty assessments
against him.

On November 17, 1986 a request for waiver or

abatement of the proposed penalties was filed with the Commission.

On March 16, 1987 Mr. Silver was notified his request for

waiver was under consideration.

On or around April 24, 1987 Mr.

Silver was notified that the requested waiver had been denied.
(R69)

On May 22, 1987 Mr. Silver filed a petition for an infor-

mal hearing before the Tax Commission.
1987 an informal hearing was held.
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(R52-66)

On November 3,

The Commission entered an

informal decision on December 29, 1987, upholding
assessments.

the proposed

(R36-40)

On January 20, 1988 an appeal from the informal decision and request for formal hearing was filed by Silver with the
Tax Commission.

(R20-24)

The formal hearing was held on Decem-

ber 10, 1988 and a final decision was rendered on March 22, 1989
upholding the proposed assessments.

(R15-19)

A petition for review was filed with the Supreme Court
on April 12, 1989.
On

or

(R8)

around

April

22, 1989

Mr.

Silver

filed

for

protection under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Act and the automatic stay went

into effect staying further proceedings before

the Supreme Court.
On
Bankruptcy

February

Court

28,

lifting

1990

an

the stay

order

was

entered

and directing

appeal proceed before the Utah Courts.

by

the

that—Silver' s

(R2-4)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Dennis Silver did not file Federal or State income tax
returns for the years 1972 to 1983 in thel belief that he did not
I
meet the minimum filing requirements.

(ft55, 56, 57, 218)

From

1972 to 1976 he was a student and did not have taxable income.
From 1976 to 1983 Silver was a self-employed radio technician and
worked part time for various radio stations.
-4-

During this period,

Silver determined that his income was below the filing requirement threshold of Utah Code Ann. $ 59-14A-48 (1973) (Addendum IV)
and that he owed no tax because of income tax withheld from his
salary.

He believed that he was not required under these circum-

stances to file an income tax return.

(R218-219)

On or around August 16, 1984 a letter was sent to
Silver from the Tax Commission regarding the status of the tax
returns for years 1972 to 1983.

(R148)

Mr. Silver contacted the Commission and discussed his
situation with Mr. Kenneth Rodall.

It was agreed between Silver

and Mr. Rodall that income tax returns for 1972 through 1976 were
not required.

However, Mr. Rodall insisted that returns for 1977

to 1983 be prepared
requested returns.

and

filed.

Silver

returns, determined

ability.

(R220-221)

to file the

(R 219f 220)

Dennis Silver, upon beginning
requested

agreed

that

work to assemble the

the work

was

beyond

his

He determined that he was unable to prepare

the returns himself so he requested assistance and information
from

the

retained

Commission, hired

a bookkeeper

the services of a CPA

(R221-222)

in

late

in approximately

1984, and
April 1985.

The CPA advised Silver of the records he would need

to assemble for the CPA to complete the tax returns. Mr. Silver,
due to his financial condition, decided to assemble the records
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himself rather than having the CPA do the work for him because of
the cost.

(R222)
While Silver was working on assembling the information

he was not contacted by the Tax Commission.

On or around August

14, 1985, without prior notice, petitiobor was served with a
notice to appear at a Writ of Mandate hearing.
Silver contacted

(R223)

Mr.

the Commission but was told to contact the

attorney general's office. (R151, 223). He contacted the attorney general's office and explained to the attorney in charge that
he was in the process of preparing returns.

Based upon Silver's

conversation with the attorney general's office, he stipulated to
entry of the Writ of Mandate against him and he understood that
he would not need to appear at the Writ of Mandate hearing.
(R168, 224)
When the Writ of Mandate was issued it provided that
returns would be filed within 30 days.

Mr. Silver notified the

attorney general's office that he would be unable to complete the
returns within 30 days.

(R224)

Silver was given an extension,

but when Silver was unable to have returns completed by the due
date set by the attorney general's office an order to show cause
hearing was scheduled for March 24, 1986.

At that hearing, the

court set a deadline of April 25, 1986 for the filing of the
returns.

(R114).

All returns, with the exception of the 1981
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return which was filed later, were filed before the April 25
deadline.

Every return reflected a refund due Silver.

(R56-57).

In spite of this fact, the Tax Commission notified Silver in
November of 1986 that they were proposing

assessment of the

negligence penalty of $50.00 per return and a fraud penalty of
$1000.00 per return.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1#,

In applying and construing tax statutes, statutes

imposing taxes and prescribing tax procedures should generally be
construed favorably
taxing authority.
from the whole act.

to the taxpayer and strictly against the
The purpose of a statute is to be gathered
In determining such purpose, resort may be

had not only to the context but to the structure and scheme of
the act.

The statute

is to be read and construed

in its

entirety.
2.

The Tax Commission has not properly interpreted or

applied the penalty statute in this case, they have not presented
evidence of a fraudulent intent.

The burden of proof to estab-

lish fraudulent intent to evade tax is upon the Tax Commission,
and they have not carried their burden of proof to establish that
petitioner had fraudulent intent to evade taxes.

The Commission

has failed to adequately investigate the facts of this case and
has subjected Dennis Silver to the fraud penalty without evidence
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to support their proposed assessment and jclaim.

The Commission

has failed to apply statutory standards and judicial guidelines
in the determination of what constitutes "fraud" and "intent to
evade".

As a result of the Commission's acts Silver has been

damaged.

He has sustained substantial costs in defending himself

and has been

forced

into bankruptcy

in order to preserve his

rights to appeal this case to the courts.

The Tax Commission has

also filed liens against Silver's property prior to obtaining a
final determination of the tax liability, contrary to the statutory procedures of the Utah Code.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE COMMISSION HAS MISINTERPRETED AND MISAPPLIED THE PENALTY STATUTE IN THIS CASE.
A,

Rules of Statutory Construction and Interpretation

Provide that Statutes Be Construed Based Upon the Entire Statute
Not Any One Part.
The general

rules of statutory

construction

provided

that the purpose of a statute is to be fathered from the whole
statute or act.

In determining the purpose the courts will look

to not only the context but to the structure and scheme of the
act and

in some cases its historical background and subsequent

amendment.
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The statute in issue is Utah Code Ann. § 59-14A-92
(1987 Supplement) (Addendum I) which when read in its entirety
and understood
create

as a whole discloses a legislature

a penalty

structure

which

provides

for

intent to

a

negligence

penalty, a civil fraud penalty and a criminal fraud penalty.
In applying and construing tax statutes, this court has
said, that statutes imposing taxes and prescribing tax procedures
should

generally

strictly

against

be construed
the

taxing

favorably
authority.

to the taxpayer and
(Bu ilde rs

Componen t

Supply Co. v. Cockayne, 22 Utah 2d 172, 450 P.2d 97 at 99 (1969).
B.
Standards

Statutory Definitions and Case Law Have Provided

in Determining What Conduct Constitutes

"Fraudulent

Intent to Evade Tax", These Standards Were not Applied in This
Case.
The phrase "fraudulent intent to evade tax" Jaas been
interpreted to mean conduct on the part of the taxpayer which is
designed to mislead or conceal the true facts of an individual
tax liability with the specific intent that tax due be evaded.
Such conduct must be willful, and with the knowledge of the legal
duty.

Fraud is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as:
A false representation of a matter of fact
whether by words or by conduct, by false or
misleading allegations, or by concealment of
that which should have been disclosed, which
deceives and is intended to deceive another
so that he shall act upon it to his legal
injury.
-9-

The Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-103 (1974) defines intent as follows:
Definition of "intentionally, or with intent
or willful"; "knowingly, or with knowledge";
"recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal
negligence" or criminally negligent".
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully or with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when
it is his conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or to cause the result;
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with
respect to his conduct or to circumstances
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of
the nature of his conduct for the existing
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or
with knowledge, with respect to a result of
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct
is reasonably certain to cause the result.
The Utah Code at Section 76-2-101 (1983) provides in pertinent
part:
No person is guilty of an offense unless his
conduct is prohibited by law and;
(1) He
acts
intentionally,
knowingly,
recklessly, with criminal negligence, or with
a mental state otherwise specified in the
statute defining the offense, as the definition of the offence requires. . . .
There are no Utah cases dealing with the interpretation
of penalty statute 59-14A-92 (1986 Supplement).
there

is

no

Utah

law,

the

Tax

Code

However, where

provides

at

59-10-103(2) (1989):
Any term used in this chapter has the same
meaning as when used in comparable context in
-10-

Section

the laws of the United States relating to
federal income taxes unless a different
meaning is clearly required. Any reference
to the Internal Revenue Code or the law of
the United States shall mean the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 as amended, or other
provisions of the laws of the United States
relating to the federal income taxes which
are in effect for the taxable year. . . .
Thus in interpreting and determining the standard to be
used we may look to Federal law.

Numerous Federal cases have

dealt with and defined what constitutes "fraudulent
evade taxes".

intent to

In the case of Michael Pavlic v. The Commissioner,

47 T.C.M. 1491 (1984) (T.C. Memo 1984-182 Dec. 41,129(M)), the
U.S. Tax Court said:
The existence of fraud is a fact which
must be determined on the basis of all the
facts and circumstances.
Fraud means "actual, intentional wrongdoing, and the intent required is the specific purpose to evade a tax believed to be
owing;" fraud is not to be imputed or presumed, and the mere failure to report income
is not sufficient to establish fraud. The
taxpayer's entire course of conduct may be
examined. (Citations omitted.)
This Court went on to say:
The United States Supreme Court has recently
said that willfulness (for tax purposes) is
"a voluntary intentional violation of a known
legal duty." This and other courts have held
that willfulness as used in the context of
tax crime includes those elements necessary
to sustain civil fraud.
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In this case the taxpayer refused to file tax returns
for 1975 to 1979 as a protest to government funding of abortions.
In addition to failing to file tax returns, the taxpayer filed
false forms W-4.

The Court sustained the fraud penalty because

the taxpayer admitted he knew he had a legal duty to file and he
undertook to hide his conduct by filing false W-4 forms.
The elements of "fraudulent intent to evade tax," are
(1) a tax due and (2) a part of the deficiency being due to
fraud.

A misunderstanding of law or a duty, will not support the

specific intent required.
In the case of Marvin G. Palmer v. The Commissioner,, 53
T.C.M. 633 (1987) (T.C. Memo 1987-204 Dec. 43,858(M)), the U.S.
Tax Court said:
Respondent bears the burden of proving fraud
by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent
must show that petitioner intended to evade
taxes which he knew or believed that he owed
by conduct intending to conceal, mislead or
otherwise prevent the collection of the
taxes. The elements to be established are:
(1) an underpayment of tax and (2) that some
part of this underpayment was due to fraud.
The existence of fraud is a factual question
to be determined by an examination of the
entire record. Fraud will never be presumed.
Fraud may however be proved by circumstantial
evidence because direct proof of taxpayer's
intent is rarely available, and taxpayer's
entire course of conduct may establish the
requisite fraudulent intent.
However, fraud is never imputed or presumed
and courts should not sustain findings of
fraud upon the circumstances that, at most,
-12-

create only a suspicion.
Even a strong
suspicion is not sufficient to show fraud,
but fraud must be established by evidence
that is clear and convincing.
(citations
omitted).
In this case, the Internal Revenue Service's assertion
of the fraud penalty was not sustained where the taxpayer presented evidence of an honest misunderstanding of the law.
The taxpayer had taken deductions related to an oil and
gas investment, which were later shown to be improper.

The Court

found that the legal issues at the time were unsettled and the
taxpayer had relied on the advice of his accountant.
The case of Cirillo v. Commissioner, 314 F.2d 478 1963)
(11 A.F.T.R. 2d 910) (Addendum III) is very similar to our case.
In this case the taxpayer, an attorney, filed his 1945 through
1954 income tax returns after being contacted by the government
in 1957.

The Commissioner asserted a fraud penalty^-and the

taxpayer appealed.
At his trial, the taxpayer testified that he had failed
to file timely returns not because of any intent to defraud, but
because he believed on the basis of a summary mental calculation
made at the end of each year, that income tax withheld from his
salary was enough to cover all income taxes payable on his salary
and the small amount of net income from self employment in his
private practice.
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The
records

of

taxpayer

receipts

conceded

and

that

expenditures

he

kept

in the

no

case

systematic
of

his

law

practice and made no detailed computation of his tax liability at
the end of each tax year.
income
returns

tax

returns

showed

that

entitled to refunds.

to

He relied on his subsequently filed

show

for

the

his

good

years

faith.

1945

His

through

income

1951

he

tax
was

For the years 1952 through 1954 there was a

small amount of tax due.

The court said:

The evidence in this case strongly
indicates that the taxpayer's failure to file
returns was willful neglect of a statutory
duty.
As a lawyer he must have been aware
that one who earns several thousand dollars a
year is obligated to file income tax returns.
Each year he was reminded of his duty to file
a return by the standard W-2 Form which he
received from his employer. . . .
But willful failure to file a timely
return, which may
create both
criminal
liability and an additional civil liability,
does not in itself and without more established liability for a fraud penalty, though
it may be relevant in that connection. Jones
v. Commissioner, 5th Cir. 1958, 259 F.2d 300
(2 Aftr. 2d 5 7 3 6 ) . . . .
The Court went on to say:
This is true because a fraud penalty can be
imposed only where proof of deficiency is
supplemented by proof that the deficiency is
due to fraud with intent to evade tax. . . .
To justify a fraud penalty the circumstances
surrounding the failure to file returns must
strongly
and
unequivocally
indicate
an
intention
to
avoid
the
payment
of
Laxes....
-14-

Taxpayer contends that his willful
failure to file was not and could not have
been the result of a scheme to cheat the
government out of taxes which he was obligated to payr because he did not believe that
he owed any taxes. We are aware that the tax
court disbelieved this testimony and that it
is not for this Appellate Court to assess
taxpayer's credibility as a witness. However , the Commissioner's heavy burden of
proof on the issue of fraud cannot be satisfied by mere disbelief of taxpayer's testimony. The record must contain some convincing affirmative indication of the required
specific intent.
The court held that for the years that no tax was due a
fraud penalty was not applicable.
C.

The

Statutory

Requirement

of

Utah

Code

Ann.

S 59-14A-92 Requires that Fraudulent "Intent to Evade" be Present
in Order to Sustain the Fraud Penalty.
The statute sets out two types of penalties, a negligence penalty and a fraud penalty.

Section (1) provides a $50

negligence penalty for failure to file a return if such failure
is without fraudulent intent.
statute

applies

The second part of the penalty

a civil/criminal

fraud

penalty

ranging

from

$1,000 to $25,000 to persons who knowingly and intentionally with
fraudulent intent to evade tax, fail to pay a tax due or file a
false

or

fraudulent

return

or

(R144,145, 146)
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supply

false

information.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-14A-92 titled "Civil and Criminal
Penalties-Limitation of Prosecution" states:
(1) Every person who, without fraudulent
intent, fails to make, render, sign or verify
any return, or to supply any information
within the time required by or under the
provisions of this chapter, is liable to a
penalty of $50 to be imposed, assessed and
collected by the Tax Commission in the same
manner as is provided by this chapter with
regard to delinquent taxes. This $50 penalty
does not apply to returns disclosing a refund
until ninety (90) days after the date the
return is due. After ninety (90) days the
penalty shall be half the refund or $50
dollars, which ever is less.
If a refund
return is filed and the gross income reported
is less than the minimum state filing
requirement,
no
penalty
may
be
applied . . . .
(3) It is unlawful for any person with
intent to evade any tax, to fail to timely
remit the full amount of tax required by this
chapter.
A violation of this section is
punishable as follows:
(a) if the amount not remitted is less
than $1,000, by fine not exceeding $1,000 or
by imprisonment not exceeding three months or
by both fine and imprisonment;
(b) if the amount not remitted is
$1,000 or more but less than $5,000, by a
fine not exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment not
to exceed six months or by both fine and
imprisonment;
(c) if the amount no remitted is $5,000
or more, but less than $10,000 by a fine not
exceeding $10,000 or imprisonment not to
exceed one year or by both fine and imprisonment; or
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(d) if the amount not remitted is
$10,000 or more, by a fine not exceeding
$25,000 or imprisonment not exceeding five
years or by both fine and imprisonment.
(4) Any person who knowingly or intentionally makes, renders, signs or verifies any
false or fraudulent return or statement or
supplies any false or fraudulent information
is guilty of the crime of making a false or
inconsistent statement and is punishable as
otherwise provided by law.
(5) Any person, who with the intent to evade
any tax or any requirement of this chapter,
or any lawful requirement of the State Tax
Commission, fails to pay the tax, or to make,
render, sign, or verify any return, or to
supply any information, within the time
required by or under this chapter, or who,
with like intent makes, renders, signs, or
verifies any false or fraudulent return or
statement, or supplies any false or fraudulent information, is liable to a civil
penalty of not more than $1,000 to be recovered by the State Tax Commission in the same
manner as provided in this chapter for the
collection of delinquent taxes and is also
guilty of Class B misdemeanor and shall be
fined not to exceed $500 or be imprisoned not
to exceed three months, or both. The fines
provided by this section shall be additional
to all other penalties in this chapter. . . .
The evidence submitted by the Audit Division in support
of the alleged fraudulent intent to evade penalty was provided by
Mrs. Marisha Milligan, a compliance officer with the State Tax
Commission.
required

She testified that as part of her duties she was

to make

assess penalties.

determinations

regarding

recommendations

to

(R158, 159). She testified that her basis for
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asserting the penalty against Dennis Silver was that it took a
long time for him to file returns after he was first contacted
and that she had requested a Writ of Mandate to obtain a court
order requiring him to file the returns he had agreed to file.
(R160).
Mrs. Milligan

also testified

that:

(1) she never

contacted or asked Dennis Silver why he had not filed returns
when due, and no one at the Tax Commission took any action to
investigate what Silver was doing after the first contact by Mr.
Rodall

(R180-181);

attempted

(2) that no one

to determine how long

frpm the Tax Commission

it would take petitioner to

prepare the requested returns (R168-169); or (3) inquired what
petitioner was doing to get the returns prepared.

(R184-185).

There was no testimony regarding fraudulent acts by Mr. Silver.
On the contrary, when asked if she as aware of any attempt by Mr.
Silver to mislead, conceal, or otherwise hide his filing intentions she answered "No, I'm not."

(R208)

Mrs. Milligan testified that her understanding of the
meaning of "intent to evade" as applied in this case was "lack of
filing returns after request had been made for the returns to be
filed," (R186) and that she was not aware of any Tax Commission
regulations defining "intent to evade" or any federal law defining "intent to evade."

(R207-208)
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Thusf the person in the Tax Commission responsible for
asserting the Fraudulent Intent to Evade Tax Penalty, asserted
the penalty without knowing why returns were not filed or what
"standard" was to be used.

The "standard" she used appears to be

that Mr. Silver had not filed, and it took him too long to file
after contacted by the Commission.

This is not the standard

provided by the statue or applicable case law.
Dennis Silver testified that based on his understanding
of the filing requirement, his income was below the legal threshold for filing a Federal return.

(R218)

The legal requirement

for filing a State income tax return is having to file a Federal
return, Utah Code Ann. S 59-14A-48 (1973) renumbered 59-10-502
(1987) (Addendum III).
Each year he would review his tax records to see what
his income was and to determine if he needed to file tax-returns.
Based upon this review he believed he was not required to file
Federal or State returns.

(R237-238).

In addition, Silver had

been contacted by the Internal Revenue Service regarding the
non-filing of his Federal returns and after an investigation the
IRS had not required that he file Federal tax returns.
Silver was surprised when

(R219).

the State Tax Commission

required him to prepare returns but he agreed to do so.

(R219)

Silver testified that when he looked into what was going to be
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required to prepare the returns.he found out he could not do it
by himself and attempted to get help.
he

retained

needed

the services of a CPA who

to be done

(R221, 234)

(R220, 221)

before

the CPA

In April 1985

instructed him on what

could prepare

the

returns.

After the Writ of Mandate was served on Silver, he

contacted the Attorney General's office and informed them that he
was

working

on

the

returns.

(R224)

The Attorney

General's

office extended him additional time to complete the returns.
Dennis Silver had retained his records but due to the
condition of the records and the number of years involved it took
him

a long

time to assemble and summarize the

prepare the Federal and State tax returqs.

information

to

(R226) (A taxpayer

must prepare a Federal return in order to do a State return).

Up

until the Writ of Mandate was served upon him, Silver did not
realized

that there was any particular deadline being

upon him to have the returns filed.

imposed

(R220-223).

The fraud penalty statute, 59-14A-92 (1986 Supplement),
provides that a person must have had fraudulent intent to evade
tax or other legal duty for the statute to apply.
Fraudulent

intent to evade tax must be determined on

the basis of all facts and circumstances.

Fraud under the cases

cited above means actual intentional wrongdoing and the intent
required is the specific purpose to evade a tax believed to be
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owed.

Fraud

is not to be imputed or presumed and the mere

failure to report income is not sufficient to establish fraud,
nor is the failure to file a return sufficient basis to establish
fraudulent intent.
Failure to file tax returns standing alone will not
support assertion of a fraud penalty.
In this case, there is no evidence that Dennis Silver
intended to avoid any tax, because no tax was owed.

There is no

evidence that he was attempting to evade anything.

He testified

that he determined that he was not required to file tax returns
by doing a summary review of his income.

(R236-238)

Had he

filed tax returns he would have received refunds from both the
State and Federal governments.

(R218)

After he was contacted by the Commission and returns
required but before the Writ of Mandate was issued, he had begun
assembling his records, hired a bookkeeper, hired an accountant
and gave every indication of a good faith effort to comply with
the Tax Commission's request.

(R221)

There was no effort on the part of the Tax Commission
to determine what action had been taken, to determine the length
of time it would reasonably take Silver to prepare the returns
nor to establish any reasonable deadlines for completion.
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Mrs. Milligan, who recommended the penalty be assessed,
testified that she was unaware of any Commission regulation which
defined "intent to evade."

She testified she was unaware of any

definition or legal standards with respect to determining "intent
to evade."

(R207-208)

She testified that her basis for propos-

ing the penalty was solely upon the non-filing, even though she
did not know the reason for such non-filing.

(R165-166)

Mrs.

Milligan took the position that the Dennis Silver took too long
in preparing the returns even though no one in the Commission,
including Mrs. Milligan, investigated what was required or how
long it would reasonably take.

(R168-169)

Clearly, the State Tax Commission has not interpreted
or applied the statute and legal standards to establish fraudulent intent to evade tax.
The conclusion reached by the Tax Commission An their
Final Decision, was that "petitioner intended to avoid filing
income tax returns . . . and intended not to maintain sufficient
information . . . ."
the

evidence

and

(R18)

does

not

This conclusion is not supported by
support

th^ fraud

penalty

which

requires a finding of "fraudulent intent to evade."
On the other hand, Silver's uncontroverted testimony
was that he believed he was below the filing threshold at the
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time each of the returns was due to be filed and that he owed no
tax.

(R218)
Based upon the foregoing it is clear that the Commis-

sion has misapplied the fraudulent intent to evade portion of the
statute, as there is no evidence of any intent on the part of
Silver to defraud the State of Utah.

There is also ample evi-

dence that he had a good faith belief that he was not required to
file State income tax returns.
POINT 2
THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO ESTABLISH "FRAUD" AND
"INTENT TO EVADE TAX* IS UPON THE TAX COMMISSION AND THE "FRAUDULENT INTENT TO EVADE"
PENALTY REQUIRES A FACTUAL DETERMINATION OF
FRAUDULENT ACTS WITH INTENT TO EVADE TAX IN
ORDER TO SUPPORT ASSESSMENT OF THE FRAUD
PENALTY.
A.

The Burden of Proof is Upon the Commission to Show

that Dennis Silver has Been Guilty of Fraud with Intent -to Evade
Tax.
Section

59-14A-94

(1986

Supplement)

(Addendum

II)

titled Burden of Proof, renumbered 59-10-543, establishes that
for purposes of taxation the burden of proof requirement

to be

followed in any proceeding before the Commission is as follows:
In any proceeding before the Tax Commission
under this act, the burden of proof shall be
upon the petitioner except for the following
issues, as to which the burden of proof shall
be upon the Tax Commission:
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(1) Whether the petitioner has been guilty
of fraud with intent to evade tax;
(emphas i s added)
The clear

legislative

intern, uj. uie ^uatute

is that

there must be some credible evidence available to the Commission
to support a claim of fraudulent intent to evade tax.
is upon

the Commission

to investigate

The burden

the facts and establish

under statutory and judicial guidelines that there is conduct by
the taxpayer which would support a claim of fraudulent intent to
evade tax by clear and convincing evidence.
B.
this

Case

The Commission Did Not

or

Attempt

to

Determine

Investigate the Facts of
if

Silver's

Conduct

was

Fraudulent.
Mr. Silver

testified

that he did not believe he was

required to file a State income tax return because he was not
required

to

file a Federal

income tax

return due

income and the fact that he did not owe any tax.
The Tax Commission
around August 16, 1984.

contacted Silver

(R148)

to-his

low

(R218-219).
by letter

on or

Silver called and spoke with Mr.

Rodall on or around August 22, at which time Silver was informed
that he would be required to file income tax returns for 1978
through
returns.

1983.

(R219)

Silver

agreed

(R219)
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to

file

the

requested

Thereafter, no further, action was taken on part of the
Tax Commission to contact Silver.

(R164-166)

Nor was any

further investigation conducted prior to the recommendation or
assessment of the fraud penalty.

(R175).

Silver stipulated to

the entry of the Writ of Mandate (R224) as he was working on the
preparation of the returns.
The attorney general's office worked with Mr. Silver
extending time for him to complete his returns through March of
1986 at which time an Order to Show Cause hearing was scheduled.
(R176).
At the Order to Show Cause hearing, the court extended
an additional 30 days, based upon Silver's testimony, in order
for him to complete the filing of the income tax returns.

(R230)

The Tax Commission contends, contrary to established
law, that fraudulent intent to evade can be inferred -from the
fact that Silver did not file returns by the original due date
(although

there

is

no

finding

that

returns

were

in

fact

required), and it took him too long to prepare returns when they
were required, even though nothing was done to determine how long
it would take.
The Tax Commissions Final Decision cites no factual
finding of fraudulent conduct.

On the contrary, the decision in

the "Findings of Fact" notes that the "Petitioner further cites
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that he knew during this period that he did not have sufficient
income to file returns . . . ."

(R16)

The conclusions reached by the Commission do not cite
fraudulent

intent

to evade

tax.

The decision

concludes

"petitioner intended to avoid filing . . ¥" and " . . .
not to maintain sufficient information .
not the statutory standard for fraud.

. ."

(R18)

that

intended
This is

Dennis Silver believed he

was not required to file, it follows that he would not file.
did not evade tax by not filing, no tax was due.

He

There is no

support in the record or the factual findings to conclude there
was fraudulent intent to evade tax, filing requirements, or any
other legal obligation.
Clearly, the Tax Commission has not carried the burden
of proof to show that Petitioner has be^n guilty of fraud with
intent to evade tax.
POINT 3
THE COMMISSION HAS FAILED TO FOLLOW STATUTORY
REQUIREMENTS AND HAS FILED LIENS AGAINST
PETITIONER PRIOR TO A FINAL DETERMINATION OF
THE PENALTY.
A.

The Utah Code Provides Statutory Procedures to be

Followed Prior to the Filing of Tax Liem>4
If the Tax Commission establishes through an audit or
other procedure that a taxpayer owes additional taxes, it must
give notice of the deficiency stating th£ amount due and demand
-26-

payment.
ciency,

The notice must set , forth the details of
indicate

how

it was

calculated

taxpayer at his last known address.

and

the defi-

be mailed

to

the

Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-524

(1987) provides:
(1) If the Commission determines that there
is a deficiency in respect of the tax imposed
by this chapter, it shall send notice of such
deficiency to the taxpayer in the manner and
with the content provided in subsection (2).
(2) The notice of deficiency shall set forth
the details of the deficiency and the manner
of its computation.
It shall be mailed,
postage pre-paid, to the taxpayer at his last
known address . . . .
A notice of deficiency is final thirty (30) days after
the date of the mailing or when the taxpayer consents in writing
to the amount of the deficiency.
ciency

from

becoming

final

A taxpayer can stop the defiby

filing

a

petition

redetermination and challenging the deficiency.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-525 (1987) provides:
(1) except in any case where the taxpayer
has earlier filed with the Commission a
petition for redetermination of the deficiency as provided in Part V, Chapter 1,
Title 59, the notice of deficiency shall
constitute a final assessment of the deficiency in tax, including interest thereon and
any penalties or additions to tax;
(a)
days, or
addressed
the union
the date
ciency to

upon the expiration of thirty (30)
ninety (90) days if the notice is
to a person outside the states of
and the District of Columbia, after
of mailing of the notice of defithe taxpayer; or
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for

(b) upon the date, when in writing, the
taxpayer agrees with the Commission that a
deficiency exists in a specified amount and
consents
to
the
assessment
of
such
deficiency, . . .
If

the

assessment

remains

unpaid

after

it becomes

final, the Tax Commission then issues a notice and demand stating
the amount due and demanding payment.
authorizing

Warrants may be issued

the local sheriff to levy upon and sell real or

personal property of the taxpayer to cover the amount assessed,
including collection costs, if a taxpayer fails to pay delinquent
amounts within ten (10) days after notice ana demand.
When

the

sheriff

receives

the warrant

he

files a

duplicate with the Clerk of the local District Court who enters
it on the court's judgment docket listing the taxpayer as a
judgment debtor.

The amount entered constitutes a binding lien

on real, personal or other property to the same extent -as other
court judgments.

Utah Code Ann. §59-10-528 (1987) provides:

(3) If any person liable under this Chapter
for any payment of any tax, addition to tax,
penalty, or other interest neglects or
refused to pay the same within ten days after
notice and demand for the payment has been
given to such person under subsection (2) the
Commission may issue a warrant in duplicate
under its official seal directed to the
sheriff of any county of the state commanding
him to levy upon and sell such persons real
and personal property for the payment of the
amount assessed, plus the cost of executing
the warrant, and to return such warrant to
the Commission and to pay to it the money
-28-

collected by virtue thereof within sixty (60)
days after the receipt of the warrant . . . .
(4) Any sheriff who receives a warrant under
subsection (3) shall within five (5) days
thereafter file the duplicate copy with the
clerk of the district court of the appropriate county.
The clerk of such court shall
thereupon enter in the judgment docket in the
column for judgment debtors the name of the
taxpayer mentioned in the warrant and in the
appropriate column the tax or other amounts
for which the warrant is issued and date when
such copy is filed.
Such amount shall
thereupon be a binding lien upon the real,
personal and other property of the taxpayer
to the same extent as other judgments duly
docketed in the office of the clerk. . .
(emphasis added)
Utah Code Ann. S 59-1-501
for

Obtaining

taxpayer may

Redetermination

of

a

(1987) entitled
Deficiency,"

"Procedure

states

file a request for agency action petitioning

Commission for redetermination of a deficiency."

the

Utah Code Ann.

S 59-1-503 (1987) provides:
(1) Following a redetermination of a deficiency by the Commission, the entire amount
determined as the deficiency by the decision
of the Commission which has become final,
shall be assessed and shall be paid within
ten (10) days after notice and demand from
the Commission.
(2) If the taxpayer does not file a petition
with the Commission within the time prescribed for filing a petition, the deficiency
notice of which has been mailed to the
taxpayer shall be assessed, and shall be paid
within ten (10) days after notice and demand
from the Commission . . . .
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"any

Utah Code Ann. S 59-1-504

(1987) entitled

"Time Determination

Final," provides:
The action of the Commission oh the taxpayer's petition for redetermination of deficiency shall be final thirty (30) days after
the date of mailing of the Commission's
notice of agency action.
All [tax, interest
and penalties are due thirty (30) days from
the date of mailing, unless the taxpayer
seeks judicial review.
Taking these statutes together, if a taxpayer disagrees
with a notice of deficiency under § 59-10-*524 he may petition for
redetermination under § 59-1-501.

Any subsequent determination

of the Tax Commission does not become final until thirty

(30)

days after the mailing of the agency's decision to the taxpayer
under

§

59-1-504.

If a

results of a petition

taxpayer

is not

for redetermination

satisfied

with

the

he can take further

action by filing a petition for review in the Tax Court Division
of the District Court and ultimately to the Utah Supreme Court.
So long as the taxpayer meets his deadlihes for filing appeals,
the decision of the Tax Commission does not become final and no
statutory lien may arise against the taxpayer under § 59-1-503
and § 59-10-528.
redetermination

The docketing of a warrant while a petition for
is pending

and before the decision of

the Tax

Commission became final would not give risp to a v^liH qfai-ni-nrv
lien.
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The only notice that Dennis Silver has received of the
proposed deficiency was mailed to him on or around November 3,
1986.

On November 17 f 1986 a petition for redetermination was

filed on behalf of Mr. Silver requesting reconsideration of the
proposed

deficiency.

acknowledged

receipt

On March 16f
of

the

1987 the Tax Commission

request

for

redetermination

and

thereafter on March 31, 1987 prior to the final determination of
the Commission (which did not take place until March 23, 1989) a
Warrant was issued and filed with the Third District Court for
Utah.

The Warrant was issued at a time when an appeal was

pending before the Tax Commission which had not been acted upon
and

therefore

final.

the proposed deficiency

could not have become

Based upon the foregoing the lien against the petition-

er's property should be released pending a final determination by
the Court of the taxpayer's liability.
CONCLUSION
As demonstrated by this brief, the burden of proof to
establish fraudulent intent to evade tax is upon the Utah State
Tax Commission.

The evidence presented by the Tax Commission in

support of its asserted fraud penalty does not meet the statutory
or judicial standards for assessment of a fraud penalty.
The penalty statue, S 59-14A-92, provides that there
must have been fraudulent "intent to evade" on the part of a
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taxpayer in order to assert the penalty.

Fraudulent intent to

evade may be shown by all of the facts and surrounding circumstances, but the failure to file tax return without other fraudulent acts does not alone support a finding of fraudulent intent
to evade.

Nor does delay in responding to the

Tax Commission's

request that returns be filed become fraud where there is no
evidence of fraudulent intent to evade or avoid a tax or other
requirement of law.
such intent.
failing

to

Here the evidence is clear that there was no

At worst, petitioner may have been negligent in
properly

required to be filed.

determine

if

in

fact

tax

returns

were

The fact that no tax was ever owed sup-

ports the petitioner's position that there could be no fraudulent
intent to evade tax.

Non-filing of tax returns standing alone

simply will not support a finding of fraudulent intent to evade
tax particularly where no tax is due.
The lien filed by the Tax Commission against petitioner's property while his appeal was pending was filed in error.
For the above and foregoing reasons it is respectfully submitted
that the decision of the Tax Commission asserting a fraud penalty
against Mr. Silver should be reversed, Mr. Silver be awarded
attorneys' fees and costs against the Tax Commission and the lien
against his property voided.
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this
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day
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. 1989:

ADDENDUM I

INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX ACT OF 19731

59-14A-91.

59-14A-92

Repealed.

Repeal. — Section 59-14A-91 (L. 1973, ch.
147, § 91; 1977, ch. 80, § 14), relating to

jeopardy assessments, was repealed by Laws
1983, ch. 283, § 10.

59-14A-92. Civil and criminal penalties — Limitation of
prosecution.
(1) Every person who, without fraudulent intent, fads to make, render,
sign, or verify any return, or to supply any information within the time
required by or under the provisions of this chapter, is liable to a penalty of
$50 to be imposed, assessed, and collected by the tax commission in the
same m a n n e r as is provided by this chapter with regard to delinquent
taxes. This $50 penalty does not apply to returns disclosing a refund until
90 days after the date the return is due. After 90 days the penalty shall be
half the refund or $50, whichever is less. If a refund return is filed and the
gross income reported is less than the minimum state filing requirement,
no penalty may be applied.
(2) As used in this section, "person" means an individual, partnership,
corporation, employer, joint-stock company, association or marketing association, or any officer or employee of any corporation, or member or any
officer or employee of any partnership.
(3) It is unlawful for any person, with intent to evade any tax, to fail to
timely remit the full amount of tax required by this chapter. A violation of
this section is punishable as follows:
(a) if the amount not remitted is less than $1,000, by a fine not
exceeding $1,000 or by imprisonment not exceeding three months or by
both fine and imprisonment;
(b) if the amount not remitted is $1,000 or more, b u t less t h a n
$5,000, by a fine not exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment not to exceed
six months or by both fine and imprisonment;
(c) if the amount not remitted is $5,000 or more, b u t less t h a n
$10,000, by a fine not exceeding $10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed
one year or by both fine and imprisonment; or
(d) if the amount not remitted is $10,000 or more, by a fine not
exceeding $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed five years or by both
fine and imprisonment.
(4) Any person who knowingly or intentionally makes, renders, signs, or
verifies any false or fraudulent return or statement or supplies any false or
fraudulent information is guilty of the crime of making a false or inconsistent statement and is punishable as otherwise provided by law.
(5) Any person who, with intent to evade any tax or any requirement of
this chapter, or any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission, fails
to pay the tax, or to make, render, sign, or verify any return, or to supply
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any information, within the time required by or under this chapter, or who,
with like intent, makes, renders, signs, or verifies any false or fraudulent
return or statement, or supplies any false or fraudulent information, is
liable to a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 to be recovered by the State
Tax Commission in the same, manner as provided in this chapter for the
collection of delinquent taxes, and is also guilty of a class B misdemeanor
and shall be fined not to exceed $500 or be imprisoned not to exceed three
months, or both. The fines provided by this section shall be additional to all
other penalties in this chapter.
(6) Upon making a record of its reasons for waiver or reduction, the State
Tax Commission may waive or reduce any of the civil penalties provided in
this chapter or compromise them.
(7) The statute of limitations for prosecution for a violation of this section is six years from the date the tax should have been remitted according
to this chapter.
History: L. 1973, c h . 147, § 92; 1983, ch.
266, § 3; 1984 (2nd S.S.), ch. 13, § 1; 1985,
ch. 193, § 1; 1986, c h . 178, § 56.
Compiler's Notes. — The 1983 amendment substituted "person" for "individual,
partnership, corporation, employer, jointstock company, association or marketing association, or any officer or employee of any
corporation, or member, or employee of any
partnership, or any officer or employee
thereof in the first paragraph of subsec. (1);
substituted "chapter^ for "act" throughout
the section; added the second paragraph of
subsec. (1); inserted subsecs. (2) and (3); inserted "civil" before "penalty" in subsec. (4);
reduced the maximum term of imprisonment
from 6 to 3 months in subsec. (4); added
subsec. (6); and made minor changes in phraseology, punctuation, and style.
The 1984 (2nd S.S.) amendment deleted
"referred to in subsection (2)" after "Every
person" in subsecs. (3) and (4).
The 1985 amendment added the second
through fourth sentences to Subsection (1),
designated the second paragraph of Subsection (1) as Subsection (2); renumbered former
Subsections (2) through (6) as Subsections (3)
through (7); deleted "the provisions of" in
Subsection (3), substituted "Any person" for
"Every person" at the beginning of Subsec-

tions (4) and (5); substituted "State Tax Commission" for "tax commission thereunder"
and for "tax commission"; deleted "the provisions of" preceding "this chapter, or who,";
deleted "is" preceding "provided in this chap;
ter" in Subsection (5); substituted "for waiver
or reduction, the State Tax Commission may1?
for "therefor the tax commission has the
power, in its discretion, to"; substituted
"them" for "the same" in Subsection (6); suln
stituted "is" for "shall be" preceding "six
years from the date"; deleted "the provisions
of* in Subsection (7); and made changes in
phraseology throughout the section.
The 1986 amendment added "or" at the end
of Subsection (3)(c) and inserted "class B" in
the first sentence of Subsection (5).
Cross-References. — Penalty for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-204, 76-3-301.
Effective Date. — Section 2 of Laws 1984
(2nd S.S.), ch. 13 provided: 'This act shall
take effect upon approval by the governor, or
the day following the constitutional time'
limit of Article VII, Sec. 8 without the gover-!
nor's signature, or in the case of veto, the
date of veto override." Approved April 6,*
1984.
Section 2 of Laws 1985, ch. 193 provided:
"This act has retrospective operation to January 1, 1985 M
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59-14A-94.

59-14A-96

B u r d e n of proof.

In any proceeding before the tax commission under this act, the burden of
proof shall be upon the petitioner except for the following issues, as to
which the burden of proof shall be upon the tax commission:
(1) whether the petitioner has been guilty of fraud with intent to
evade tax;
(2) whether the petitioner is liable as the transferee of property of a
taxpayer, but not to show that the taxpayer was liable for the tax; and
(3) whether the petitioner is liable for any increase in a deficiency
where such increase is asserted initially after a notice of deficiency was
mailed and a petition under Chapter 30, Title 59 is filed, unless such
increase in deficiency is the result of a change or correction of federal
taxable income required to be reported, and of which change or correction the tax commission had no notice at the time it mailed the notice
of deficiency.
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Supreme Court has made it clear in
[q 63-4S0]
Enochs v. Williams Packing & N a v i g a tion Co., 370 U.S. 1 [9 A F T R 2d 1594]
Joseph A. CIRILLO and Martha R(1962), that a s h o w i n g of irreparable inCirillo, Petitioners,
jury is insufficient to overcome the barv.
rier of § 7 4 2 1 ( a ) . In that case, the S u COMMISSIONER of rntcrna! Revenue,
preme Court said that only where there
Respondent.
is no adequate remedy at l a w and "it is
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
clear that under no circumstances could
Petitioner,
the Government ultimately prevail" can
v.
1
a suit for an injunction be maintained.
Joseph A Cirillo and Martha R CiriUo,
Id. a t 7. The appellants have not met
Respondents.
that double burden.
U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit,
N o s . 13.902, 13,903, Mar. 1, 1963. 314
There m a y be s o m e doubt about the
F.2d 478.
ultimate liability of appellant Montagni,
since it is alleged that he w a s not at a n y
fl 61,192 P-H Memo TC (Opinion by
time an officer or employee of the bankBruce, J.) affirmed in part and rerupt corporation and § 6671(b) of the
versed in part. Years 1945—1954.
Code s t a t e s that the word "person*' as
Decision in part for Government and
used in § 6672 "includes a n officer or
in part for taxpayer.
employee of a corporation * * *.** B u t
Montagni w a s a substantial stockholder 1. A S S E S S M E N T A N D COLLECTION
—Interest and additions—fraud penof the corporation, and for aught that
alty—failure to file return.
appears in the complaint h e m a y also
have been a director. I t m a y well be
Taxpayer not liable for fraud penalty
that the reference to officers and e m imposed for the years 1945-1951; fraud
ployees in § 6671(b) is exemplary and penalty properly imposed for the years
not exclusive. In United S t a t e s v. Gra1952-1954. Taxpayer, a "part-time** lawham, 309 F.2d 210 [10 A F T R 2d 5807]
yer, received his W-2 forms from his full
(1962), the N i n t h Circuit held that a
time employers, but failed to file returns
director could be liable under § 6672, s a y reporting the income from either full
ing t h a t the word "person** w a s not
time employment or his part time law
strictly limited to officers and employ- practice. The Commissioner failed to
ees, but included "all those so connected
prove taxpayer, in the years 1945-1951,
w i t h a corporation a s to be responsible intended to evade taxes since from taxfor the performance of the a c t in respect
payer's rough calculations the income
of which the violation occurred.*' Id. a t
tax withheld indicated he had overpaid
212. W e need not decide that question
taxes. For the years 1952-1954, even
now. I t is sufficient that the appellants rough calculations would s h o w substanhave not m e t the requirement of showtial deficiencies.
The
Commissioner
ing that under a view of the law m o s t
proved taxpayer's fradulent intent in
favorable to the government, it cannot
failing to file in these years.
Reference;
establish its claim. N o more is required
1963 P-H Fed. \ 19,199.
of the government than that it act in
2. A S S E S S M E N T A N D COLLECTION
good faith. Enochs, supra, at 7. Since
" —Interest and additions—fraud penthe appellants have not shown that the
alty—amount.
government has not so acted here, their
The fraud penalty under the *39 Code
complaint w a s properly dismissed.'
where there is a failure to file a timely
Affirmed.
return is imposed upon the correct tax
1
Any implication in Botta v. Scanlon. 288 F. 2d 504 (7 AFTR 2d 9G61 <2 Cir. 1961). and
National Foundry Co. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 229 F.2d 149 f48 AFTR 8533 (2 Cir.
195G) t h a t either one of these circumstances may alone be sufficient is overruled by
Enochs.
* The district court found that the appellants' allegations of financial hardship did not
present "special circumstances" sufficient to maintain their suit. Compare our prior
opinion in this case. 288 F.2d a t 508. where we said that the "special and extraordinary
circumstances" which permit a suit to restrain the collection of taxes do not "embrace
financial hardship in making the payment." Since we dispose of the case on other
grounds, we do not consider whether, under the bifurcated requirement established by
Enochs, the allegations of financial hardship were sufficient to show that there was no
adequate remedy a t law.
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liability without a n y deduction for either
income taxes withheld or the amount of
tax shown on the delinquent returns.
Reference:
1963 P-H Fed. fl 19,192.
3. INDIVIDUAL. R E T U R N S — J o i n t returns' of husband and wife—liability
for tax and penalties.
Wife not liable for fraud penalty imposed after filing delinquent joint returns with her husband for the years involved. The husband's fraud was based
on his failure to file a timely return and
not on anything contained in the delinquent joint return. Reference: 1963 P-H
Fed. f 17,029.

J a m e s C. Larrimer, Dougherty, Larrimer & Lee, 3220 Grant Bldg., Pittsburgh 19, Pa., Atty. for Petitioners in
13902 and Respondent in 13903.
David I. Granger, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Wash. 25, D.C., for Respondent in
13902 and Petitioner in 13903.
On Petitions for Review of a Decision
of the T a x Court of the United States.
Before M c L A U G H L I N and H A S T I E .
Circuit Judges; and D U M B A U L D . District Judge.
Opinion of the Court
H A S T I E , Circuit Judge:
In June, 1957, Joseph Cirilio and his
wife, Martha, jointly filed their first income tax returns for the years 1945 to
1954, inclusive. T h e y acted after having
learned that revenue agents were investigating the husband's tax liability.
Throughout the years in question, the
husband had received both a regular salary as a municipal employee, from which
appropriate s u m s had been withheld on
account of income taxes, and modest
fees earned in the part-time practice of
l

law. The wife had received no income.
The Commissioner disallowed certain deductions claimed in the delinquent returns and imposed penalties. The controversy ultimately reached the Tax
Court, which sustained the deficiencies
determined by the Commissioner and
held that part of each annual deficiency
had resulted from fraud with intent to
evade taxes. 'The Tax Court held both
spouses liable for the amounts of the
deficiencies not covered by salary withholdings and imposed an additional 50%
fraud penalty for each year upon the
husband alone, i T.C. Memo 1961-192.
The case is here on cross petitions
wherein the spouses urge that the fraud
penalty w a s both unjustified and erroneously computed, while the Commissioner
claims that fraud penalties should have
been imposed upon both husband and
wife.
[ 1 ] Before the Tax Court. Joseph
Cirilio, whom we shall call the taxpayer,
testified that he had failed to file timely
returns, not because of any intent to
defraud, but because he believed, on the
basis of a summary mental calculation
made at the end of each year, that the
withholdings from his salary alone were
enough to cover all income taxes payable o n both his salary and his small net
income from private law practice. Cf.
First Trust & Sav. Bank v. United
States, 8th Cir. 1953, 206 F.2d 97 [44
A F T R 2 3 9 ] . However, he concedes that
he kept no systematic records of receipts and expenditures in the course of
his practice and made no detailed computation of his tax liability at the end of
each taxable year. In the absence of
such records, he urges that the good
faith and reasonableness of his asserted
belief that his taxes were covered by
salary withholdings are substantiated by

T h e T a x C o u r t ' s c o m p u t a t i o n w a s a s followsi :
Corrected
Taxable
Tax
Income
Tax
Year
Net
Income
Withheld
Liability *
1945
$ 4,552.28
5 644.00
% 543.40
1946
4,912.62
575.00
550.40
1947
4.931.5S
679.19
619.20
1948
5.192.38
563.14
646.00
1949
5.578.35
627.20
614.00
1950
6.092.12
667.80
754.48
1951
6,368.59
943.36
808.70
1952
8.402.91
1.528.32
991.20
1953
10.132.22
1.903.20
1.015.20
1954
7.093.42
1.480.54
914.40

Additional
Tax Due
$100.60
24.60
59.99

Overpayment

$82.86
12.80
86.68
134.66
537.12
888.00
566.14

* F o r e a c h y e a r t h e a d d i t i o n a l f r a u d p e n a l t y w a s 60% of t h e a m o u n t s h o w n In t h i s
column.
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the subsequent detailed computations
bilities, withholdings and consequent obwhich appear in the delinquent returns
ligations and overpayments shown on
filed in 1957. In summary, the tax liathose returns are as follows:

Year
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954

Tax
Liability
,$ 498.00
500.00
522.00
495.66
460.24
490 38
664.92
991.94
1.244.71
1,123.72

Although the T a x Court disallowed
about half of the deductions claimed in
these returns, the taxpayer relies on the
court's finding" that "there is no contention or showing that the delinquent returns involved here are fraudulent".
The taxpayer does not challenge the
existence of deficiencies or their amounts
as found by the T a x Court. Therefore,
w e have to consider only whether and
to w h a t extent fraud penalties were
justified.
The evidence in this case strongly indicates that the taxpayer's failure to file
returns w a s a willful neglect of a statutory duty. A s a lawyer, he must have
been aware that one w h o earns several
thousand dollars a y e a r is obligated to
file income t a x returns. E a c h year he
w a s reminded of his d u t y to file a return
by the standard W-2 Form which he received from his employer. Moreover, he
has been convicted of the misdemeanor
of willful failure to file income tax returns for the years 1953 and 1954. United
S t a t e s v. Cirillo, 3d Cir. 1957, 251 F.2d
638 [1 A F T R 2d 4 5 1 ] , cert, denied, 1958,
356 U.S. 949.2
But willful failure to file a timely return, which m a y create both criminal
liability and an additional civil liability.

Tax
Withheld
$ 543.40
550.40
619.20
646.00
614.00
667.80
808.70
991.20
1,015.20
914.40

Additional
Tax Due

$

Overpayment
of Tax
$ 45.40
50.40
97.20
150.34
153.76
177.42
143.78

.74
229.51
209.32

does not in itself and without more e s tablish liability for a fraud penalty,
though it m a y be relevant in that connection. Jones v. Commissioner. 5th Cir.
1958, 259 F.2d 300 [2 A F T R 2d 5 7 3 6 ] .
This is true because a fraud penalty can
be imposed only where proof of a deficiency is supplemented by proof that the
"deficiency is due to fraud with intent to
evade tax". I n t Rev. Code of 1939, § 293
( b ) , ch. 2, 53 Stat. 88; cf. I n t Rev. Code
of 1954. § 6653(b). First Trust & Sav.
Bank v. United States, supra. The critical question is whether the circumstances attending a particular failure to
file warrant an inference of intention to
evade t a x e s . Moreover, the evidence
must be evaluated in the light of the
settled rule that fraud can be established
only by clear and convincing proof or, a s
w e have put it, "by something impressively more than a slight preponderance
of evidence". Valetti v. Commissioner,
3d Cir. 1958. 260 F.2d 185, 188 [2 A F T R
2d 5914]. Accord, Goldberg v. Commissioner. 5th Cir. 1956, 239 F.2d 316 [50
A F T R - 1 1 5 5 ] . To justify a fraud penalty
the circumstances surrounding the failure to file returns must strongly and unequivocally indicate an intention to avoid
the payment of taxes. P o w e l l v. Granquist, 9th Cir. 1958, 252 F.2d 56 [ 1 A F T R

• T a x p a y e r complains t h a t the admission into evidence of the record of his conviction
of willful failure to file returns was error, and that, in any event, tho court should have
allowed him to show the limited scope of the evidence on which that conviction was based.
He is mistaken. His conviction was admissible as evidence of the fact t h a t his failure to
file returns for the two years in question was willful. Richard F. Smith. 1958. 31 T.C. 1. 9;
see Stagecrafters* Club. Inc v District of Columbia Division of American Legion. D.D.C.
1953. I l l F. Supp. 127, aff'd. (sic] mem . D C. Cir. 1954, 211 F.2d 81 [811. affj:., 110 F. Supp.
481. 43 AFTR 504}; cf. Masters v. Commissioner. 3d Cir. 957. 243 F 2d 335, 338-39 f51 A F T R
84J (admissibility of conviction on nolo contendere plea, if not as a conclusive determination of that fact, compare Meyer J. Safra, 1958. 30 T.C. 1026, 1034-35, nonacq., 19C2 Int.
Rev. Bull. No 43. a t 8, with Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 1951. 340 U.S.
558, 5G8-C9 (dictum).
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2d 7 1 9 ] ; cf. Bender v. Commissioner, 7th
O r . 1958, 256 F.2d 771 [2 AFTR 2d 5 0 7 8 ] .
Taxpayer contends that his willful
failure to file w a s not and could not have
been the result of a scheme to cheat the
government out of taxes which he w a s
obligated to pay, because he did not believe that he owed any taxes. We are
aware that the T a x Court disbelieved
this testimony and that it is not for this
appellate court to assess taxpayer's
credibility as a witness. However, the
Commissioner's heavy burden of proof
on the issue of fraud cannot be satisfied
by mere disbelief of taxpayer's testimony. The record must contain s o m e
convincing" affirmative indication of the
required specific intent.
Taxpayer's delinquent returns lend
considerable credibility to his testimony
concerning the years from 1945 through
1951. T a k i n g into account the expenses
which he believed he w a s entitled to deduct plus the credit for income t a x e s
withheld, taxpayer calculated that he
had overpaid his taxes for each of those
years by amounts in order of fifty to one
hundred seventy-five dollars. These delinquent returns were not fraudulent,
and there is no s h o w i n g or argument
that any of the deductions claimed but
disallowed were fictitious. Only because
taxpayer w a s unable to substantiate
them with the kind of records which the
Commissioner properly demanded 3 w a s
it determined that he owed additional
t a x e s for each of these years except
1948. And for that y e a r it is agreed that
he owes nothing. All of this corroborates taxpayer's testimony that a t the
end of each of these years he believed
that he owed the government no taxes
beyond w h a t had already been withheld
from his salary.
In the face of this evidence, the Commissioner offered little to sustain his
burden of proving fraud for the years
1945 to 1951. Apart from evidence
which, as already pointed out, builds a
very strong case of willful failure to file
without demonstrating the intent which
accompanied that failure, the only evidence offered by the Commissioner w a s
the taxpa3'er's failure to keep s y s t e m atic and detailed records of income and
expenditures of his law practice. T h e
significance of this omission is minimized by the fact that from 1945
• Of course, the burden of proof on this
sioner. 4th O r . 1950. 179 F.2d 483 [38 A F T R

[ 910 (314 F.2d 478)
through 1951, taxpayer's practice was
very small, never yielding receipts in
excess of $2200 in any year and, in several years, yielding less than $1000. Indeed, government agents conceded that,
even without such records, they were
able to determine the amount of taxpayer's earnings from bank deposit statements retained by him, and that there
w a s no indication that taxpayer had received additional income not reflected in
these statements. Thus, the only needed
information which w a s lacking because
of the taxpayer's failure to keep books
w a s a record of the expenditures which
he made in the regular course of his law
practice. In these circumstances, any
inference that taxpayer's unbusinesslike procedure w a s intended to conceal
tax liability is too weak to achieve the
clear and convincing character which
proof of fraud must exhibit
The years 1952, 1953 and 1954 present
a different picture. In 1952, taxpayer's
gross income from his law practice increased very substantially to $4,169.70,
four times a s much a s it had been in
any y e a r before 1951 and twice as much
as it had been in 1951, while his deductible expenses did not increase proportionately. Moreover, withholdings did
not increase substantially. A s a consequence, the t a x withheld from taxpayer's salary in 1952 w a s more than $500
short of covering: his total tax liability.
E v e n his o w n calculations for 1952, made
several years later, failed to disclose an
overpayment such a s those he consistently claimed for the years before 1952.
A n d for 1953 and 1954, taxpayer's delinquent returns admitted substantial deficiencies. Thus, the record indicates that
at the end of 1952 and thereafter, even a
rough calculation, honestly made, would
at least have shown the taxpayer that
there w a s need for a more careful analysis of income and expenditures to substantiate or dissipate his hope that no
additional t a x e s were due. His disingenuous avoidance of accurate knowledge
when the need for such knowledge must
have been apparent w a s in itself a substantial indication of fraudulent intent.
We conclude, therefore, that the evidence of fraud w a s sufficiently clear and
convincing to justify the imposition of
fraud penalties for the years 1952, 1953
and 1954. Not so, however, for the years
from 1945 through 1951.
was on the taxpayer. Burka v. Commis-
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ftaud penalty measuied by his total 1952
£2J Our next consideration is the
tax liability, he could terminate that
method employed by the Tax Court in
liability for fiaud by filing a delinquent
computing fraud penalties Section 293
return admitting his full tax liability. It
(b) of the 1939 Code provides that "if
is not surprising that the Tax Court has
any part of any deficiency is due to
consistently refused to give any such
fraud", a fraud penalty shall be imposed
effect to a delinquent filing, reasoning
at the rate of "50 per centum of the
that the "return" contemplated by sectotal amount of the deficiency". In this
tion 271 is a timely return. Charles F
case the T a x Court added 50% to the
Bennett, 1958, 30 T.C. 114; Maitland A.
taxpayer's total liability for each year
Wilson, 1946, 7 T.C. 392 [ 3 9 5 ] ; sec George
as a fraud penalty, without having subM. Still, Inc., 1953, 19 T.C. 1072, affd
tracted either the amount withheld from
mem., 2d Cir. 1955, 218 F.2d 639 [46
salary or the amount of tax reported on
A F T R 1538] (correction of fraudulent
the delinquent return.
return by amended return does not affect
In section 271(a) as amended, 58
computation of fraud penalty); Cf Simon
Stat. 245 (1944:), "deficiency" is defined
v. Commissioner, 8th Cir. 1957, 248 F.2d
a s "the amount by which the tax im869 [52 A F T R 698] (carryback deducposed by this chapter exceeds . . . the
tion does not affect computation of fraud
amount shown as the tax by the taxpenalty). We think this conclusion is
payer upon his return, if a return w a s
consistent with the language and the
made. . . .*' Section 2 7 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) explicitly
scheme of the 1939 Code. It validates
provides that "the tax imposed by this
the T a x Court's computation of 1952
chapter and the tax shown on the return
and 1953 fraud penalties. The parties
shall both be determined . . . without
recognize that section 6 6 5 3 ( d ) ( 1 ) of the
regard to the credit under section 35
1954 Code, which is applicable to the
[for amounts withheld from w a g e s ] .
1954
fraud penalty, has now explicitly
. . ." This language makes it clear that
provided that only a timely return is to
neither the existence nor the amount of
be considered in determining the existthe "deficiency" of a taxpayer who has
ence and amount of the underpayment
failed to file a return is affected in any
which is the measure of the fraud
w a y by the existence of a withholding
penalty.
credit partially or fully offsetting his tax
liability. Moreover, in the circumstances
of this case the "total amount of the
deficiency", upon which the fraud penalty
is based, m u s t be the entire amount of
the "tax imposed" for the year unless,
under the section 271 definition of deficiency, it is permissible to deduct from
that total tax liability the amount of
tax shown on the delinquent return filed
several years after the due date. We
think this is not permissible.
1952 is the first year a s to which w e
have concluded that fraud w a s proved.
When the deadline for filing a 1952 tax
return passed, a "deficiency" in the
amount of "the tax imposed" came into
existence. Because no return had then
been filed, there simply w a s no "amount
shown as the tax by the taxpayer upon
his return" to be deducted from the
total tax liability in computing the "deficiency".
And since the failure to file
w a s fraudulent the taxpayer's liability
at that time included a fraud penalty
measured by that deficiency. Thus, taxpayer has to take the position that although, from 1953 until his delinquent
filing in 1957, he was liable for a 1952
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£SJ Finally, the Commissioner asks
us to reverse the T a x Court's holding
that Martha Cirillo, unlike her husband,
is not liable for fraud penalties. The
Commissioner argues that the wife's action in joining her husband in filing nonfraudulent delinquent returns for the
years in question w a s sufficient to m a k e
her too liable for the fraud penalties.
Earlier cases have decided that a
wife who is a party to a fraudulent joint
return may be held liable for the fraud
penalties assessed on account of her
husband's fraud in preparing that return, notwithstanding that she herself
had no income, did not entertain any
fraudulent intent, and, indeed, did not
know that the return w a s fraudulent.
Estate of Ginsberg v. Commissioner, 5th
Cir. 1959, 271 F.2d 511 [4 AFTR 2d
5 7 6 1 ] ; Furnish v. Commissioner, 9th
Cir. 1958, 262 F.2d 727, 731-34 [3 A F T R
2d 5 4 1 ] ; Kann v. Commissioner, 3d Cir.
1953, 210 F 2 d 247 [45 AFTR 309], cert
denied 1954, 347 U.S. 967; Boyett v
Commissioner. 5th Cir 1953, 204 F.2d 205,
43 AFTR 915; Howell v. Commissioner,
6th Cir. 1949, 175 F.2d 240 [38 AFTR
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G3]; Meyer J. Safra, 195S, 30 T.C. 102G,
1037. The feature which distinguishes
the present case from those earlier cases
and makes it one of first impression is
that the joint returns here involved were,
themselves not fraudulent; rather fraud
occurred and penalties attached earlier
when the husband, with fraudulent intent,
failed to file timely returns.
Whether this distinction warrants a
different result depends upon the interpretation given to section 5 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) of
the 1939 Code, ch. 2, 53 Stat. 27, a s
amended, 62 StaL 115 (1948) (now Int.
Rev. Code of 1954. § 6013(d) ( 3 ) ) . which
provides that where a joint return is
filed "liability w i t h respect to the tax"
shall be joint and several. It is reasonable to view "the tax" for which the
re turn-signing wife is liable as including
both the amount stated in the joint return and any deficiency assessments on
account of the incorrectness, inadequacy
or bad faith of that filing. If a wife,
however innocently, joins in a fraudulent return, a n y additional assessment
for fraud is a t a x obligation created by
that filing and measured by the difference between the tax that should have
been reported and the amount the
spouses jointly reported. This rationale
supports the cited cases involving fraudulent joint returns.
B u t in the present case the fraud
penalty is neither imposed for nor m e a s ured by any deficiency based upon the
joint return. Indeed, we have already
pointed out in another connection that
the deficiency upon which the present
fraud penalty is based arose when the
husband, w i t h intent to evade taxes,
failed to file a timely return. T h a t deficiency did not subject the wife to any
liability. Joseph A. Mundy, 1955, 14
CCH T a x CL Mem., 1067 [« 55,270 P-H
Memo T C ] . In these circumstances, the
fraud penalty is in no way dependent
upon the joint return. For this reason
it m a y reasonably be regarded a s distinct from the tax liability which section
5 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) imposes as a consequence of
s i g n i n g a joint return. Of course, this
analysis leaves a wife who elects to sign
a joint return liable for the tax shown
on the return and any deficiencies which
may be determined in connection with
that filing. Neither the language of the
statute nor any consideration of equity
or tax policy provides a persuasive reason for imposing a broader liability.
Accordingly, w e agree with the Tax

Court that Mrs. Cirillo did not become
liable for fraud penalties.
So much of the Tax Court's decision
a s imposed fraud penalties for the years
1945 to 1951, inclusive, will be reversed.
Otherwise, the decision will be affirmed.

[^ 63-481]
DODD DISTRIBUTING COMPANY
and General Wholesale Company,
Plaintiffs,
v.
U.S., Defendant.
U.S. District Court, N. Dist. of Ga., Atlanta Div., Nos. 7540, 7901, Jan. 10.
1963.
Years 1956-1957.
ment.

Decision for Govern-

1. B U S I N E S S E X P E N S E S — Expenditures against public policy—questionable, unethical or unlawful business
expenditures.
Amounts allegedly paid by taxpayercompanies to a State Revenue Commissioner were not made to influence his
opinion, judgment, decree or behavior in
his capacity as Commissioner. Jury verdict. Reference:
1963 P-H Fed. f 11,265.
2.

B U S I N E S S E X P E N S E S — Ordinary
and necessary.
Amounts allegedly paid by taxpayercompanies to a State Revenue Commissioner were not both ordinary and necess a r y business expenses. Jury verdict.
Reference:
1963 P-H Fed. f 11.031. '54
Code Sec. 1 6 2 ( a ) .

J a m e s M. Roberts, 610 Fulton Natl.
Bk. Bldg., Atlanta 3. Ga., A t t y for
Plaintiff.
Slaton Clemmons, Asst. U.S. Atty.,
P.O. B o x 912, Atlanta 1, Ga., for Defendant.
Charge of the Court
MORGAN, District Judge:
Members of the Jury, you have been
sworn as jurors to try the case of Dodd
Distributing
Company
and
General
Wholesale Company against the United
States of America. These are two separate and distinct cases, and it will be
necessary for you to consider and determine each of these cases. They are
being tried together inasmuch as they
are factually similar, and it would be
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ADDENDUM IV

INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX ACT OF 1973
59-14A-88.
59-14 A-89.
59-14A-90.
59-14A-91.
59-14A-92.
59-14A-93.
59-14A-94.
59-14A-95.
59-14A-9G.
59-14A-97.
59-14A-98.

59-14A-49

Interest on overpayments and refunds.
Additions to tax and ivil penalties.
Transferees.
Jeopardy assessment.
Criminal penalties.
Venue of offenses—Evidence.
Burden of proof.
General powers and duties of the tax commission.
Confidentiality of return information—Penalties—Exchange of information with Internal Revenue Service or governmental units.
Fiscal year taxpayers.
Effective date.

59-14A-47. T a x p a y e r records, s t a t e m e n t s a n d special r e t u r n s . — (a)
Kvcry person liable for a n y t a x imposed by this act, or for the collections
•hereof, shall keep such records, r e n d e r such statements, make such r e t u r n s
.imi comply w i t h such rules a n d regulations as the t a x commission m a y from
'into to time by r e g u l a t i o n prescribe. W h e n e v e r in the j u d g m e n t of the t a x
•ninmission it is necessary, it m a y r e q u i r e a n y person, by notice served
•ifKin such person or by regulations, to make such r e t u r n s , r e n d e r such
<t;i<cments, or k e e p such records, as the t a x commission deems sufficient to
-liow whether or n o t such person is liable for t a x u n d e r this act.
(h) The t a x commission may, in its discretion, p r o m u l g a t e regulations
••r instructions t h a t p e r m i t a t a x p a y e r to s u b m i t specified excerpts from his
federal r e t u r n in lieu of s u b m i t t i n g a copy of the entire federal r e t u r n .
History: L. 1973, ch. 147, § 47.

Collateral References.
Taxation<§=>1079.
85 C.J-S. Taxation § 1102.

59-14A-48. P e r s o n s r e q u i r e d to file r e t u r n s . — A n income t a x
ith respect to the t a x imposed by this a c t shall be filed by:

return

(a) E v e r y r e s i d e n t individual, estate or t r u s t required to file a federal
wonic tax r e t u r n for the t a x a b l e y e a r ;
(1)) E v e r y n o n r e s i d e n t individual, estate or t r u s t having federal gross
iirome derived from sources w i t h i n the s t a t e for the taxable y e a r a n d rejuircd to file a federal income t a x r e t u r n for such taxable year...
History: L. 1973, ch. 147, § 48.
Collateral References.
T:ix:i(ionC=5l079.

85 C.J.S. Taxation § 1102.
Returns, 71 Am. Jur. 2d 850, State and
,, m : : i l T ;ix:ition §589 ct sen,.

59-14A-49. R e t u r n s b y h u s b a n d a n d wife.—(a) A husband and wife
:iy make a single r e t u r n j o i n t l y with respect to the tax imposed b y this
•••levo.ii though one of the spouses has neither gross income nor deductions,
frpt as provided below :
M) no j o i n t r e t u r n shall be made if the husband and wife arc not
•niiill.ed to file a j o i n t r e t u r n for federal income tax purposes;
<_) if the federal income, fax liability of husband or wife is determined
•n ;i separate r e t u r n for federal income tax purposes, the income t a x
alulity of each spouse shall be determined on a separate return u n d e r
•'-is net;
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